Contrary to Stewardship theory, which regards corporate managers as the guardians of the long-term interests of owners, the Agency theory proposes that the conflict of interests between owner and management causes information asymmetry between the aforementioned parties and, consequently, provides managers with an opportunity to use this asymmetry for their own benefit. Accordingly, the formation of an audit committee could be one of the solutions to this issue. The presence of an audit committee enhances the quality of financial reporting by improving the level of corporate governance structure. The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of audit committee attributes on cosmetic accounting considering the moderating role of audit fees. Audit committee attributes including financial expertise, gender diversity, independence and size are used as our independent variables and cosmetic accounting is used as our dependent variable in the research model. We measure the dependent variable by using the Eckel’s(1981) income-smoothing model. The research sample consists of 140 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2015 to 2019. We employ Pooled logistic regressions to examine research hypotheses. Research findings suggest that financial expertise are significantly associated with cosmetic accounting. However, our results do not indicate any significant relationship between the independence of the audit committee gender diversity and the size of the audit committee and the dependent variable. Likewise, we find no convincing evidence that audit remuneration moderates the relationship between audit committee attributes and cosmetic accounting.